Abstract for Tropman Paper:

Moral intuitionism, in its classic formulation, was held by many leading British moral theorists in the early twentieth century, including G. E. Moore ([1903] 1993) and W. D. Ross ([1930] 2002).   By the 1950’s, intuitionism had fallen out of favor, and until quite recently, the view has been considered unworthy of serious attention.  The renewed interest in intuitionism can be credited, in large part, to several updated versions of the view, such as the new intuitionistic theories of Robert Audi (1996; 2004) and Russ Shafer-Landau (2003).  While intuitionism is starting to regain credibility, it remains an outlier position.  One of the obstacles to its wider acceptance, I suspect, is the sense that its truth is incompatible with a naturalistic worldview.  In this paper, I defend intuitionism, in its more recent formulations, against the criticism that there is something objectionably non-natural about its conception of moral properties.